Pace International Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 2 Spring 2021

Article 4

May 2021

Doe v. Nestle, S.A.: Chocolate and the Prohibition on Child Slavery
Megan M. Coppa
Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Human
Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisdiction Commons,
Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Megan M. Coppa, Doe v. Nestle, S.A.: Chocolate and the Prohibition on Child Slavery, 33 Pace
Int'l L. Rev. 261 (2021)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

DOE V. NESTLE, S.A.:
CHOCOLATE AND THE
PROHIBITION ON CHILD
SLAVERY
Megan M. Coppa
I. Introduction .......................................................................... 262
II. The Alien Tort Statute ......................................................... 264
A. Claims That are Actionable Under the ATS .......... 267
B. Corporate Liability Under the ATS......................... 271
C. Extraterritorial Application of the ATS .................. 275
III. Scope of Aiding and Abetting Liability for Violations of
International Law ........................................................... 277
A. Actus Reus ................................................................. 278
B. Mens Rea ................................................................... 280
IV. Doe v. Nestle, S.A. ................................................................ 281
A. The Pleadings Stage ................................................. 281
B. Nestle I (C.D. Cal. 2010) ........................................... 284
C. First Appeal – Nestle II (9th Cir. 2014). ................. 292
D. Nestle III (C.D. Cal. 2017) ........................................ 297
E. Second Appeal – Nestle IV (9th Cir. 2019).............. 300
F. Petition for Certiorari – Nestle V (2020) ................. 303
V. Analysis and Conclusion..................................................... 304



Megan M. Coppa, J.D., Managing Editor, PACE INTERNATIONAL LAW
REVIEW, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, 2021; B.A.,
Montclair State University, 2015. Thank you to all who edited and assisted in
publishing this article, especially Caroline Zicca, and to my family, my fiancé,
and my friends for their endless support and encouragement.

261

1

262

PACE INT’L L. REV.
I.

Vol. 33.2

INTRODUCTION

West Africa is presently home to approximately 1.5 million
acres of cocoa farmland, which subsequently produces 70% of the
world’s current chocolate supply.1 Côte d’Ivoire, also known as
the Ivory Coast, is one of the largest cocoa producing countries
within West Africa.2 Between 1995 and 2011, the annual
production of cocoa beans on the Ivory Coast increased by
approximately 600,000 tons and by an additional 40% in the
2013–2014 season.3 This increase was attributed to the
expansion of cocoa farmland in response to land scarcity in
traditional production areas.4 The Ivory Coast has faced, and
still faces, significant deforestation and land degradation due to
the large infestation of pests and diseases, early aging of
unshaded trees, lack of access to credit and agricultural inputs,
and lack of land ownership; conditions that have produced
several virus outbreaks.5
The increase of farmland and the need to control the
deteriorating conditions have always created a demand for farm
workers.6 Regrettably, more than 1.5 million cocoa farm
workers in West Africa are currently children.7 These child
workers are exposed to hazardous dust, flames, smoke, and
chemicals, are required to utilize dangerous tools that they are
not properly trained to use, and are subject to various forms of
physically demanding work.8 In the early 2000s, the Ivorian
government ratified the International Labour Organization’s
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour
1 Marius Wessel & P.M. Foluke Quist-Wessel, Cocoa Production in West
Africa, a Review and Analysis of Recent Developments, 74–75 NJAS –
WAGENINGEN J. LIFE SCI. 1, 2 (2015).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 SLAVE FREE CHOCOLATE, http://www.slavefreechocolate.org/ (last visited
May 12, 2021).
8 Cocoa
Campaign
–
Background,
INT’L
LAB.
RTS.
F.,
https://laborrights.org/industries/cocoa (last visited May 12, 2021);
phbalancedfilms, Contrasts: Things Kids Like, YOUTUBE, at 1:40 (Mar. 27,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4a7p33UJ-Aw&feature=emb_title.
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(Convention 182).9 Convention 182 provides that each member
ratifying the Convention “shall take immediate and effective
measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst
forms of child labour as a matter of urgency” and further
specifies all forms and uses of child labor incorporated therein.10
There are presently 187 countries that have ratified Convention
182.11
In addition to Convention 182, United States
Congressman Eliot Engel and former United States Senator
Tom Harkin introduced the “Harkin-Engel Protocol.”12 The
Harkin-Engel Protocol, also known as the “Cocoa Protocol,” is an
international agreement that applies Convention 182’s purpose
specifically to child labor occurring on cocoa farms. 13 The
Harkin-Engel Protocol is enforced through a designated timeline
of goals and standards which are to be met by all corporations
operating in any participating region and who knowingly receive
their cocoa beans from farms that utilize child labor.14
Although Convention 182 and The Harkin-Engel Protocol
have resulted in a decrease of child labor, it remains to exist on
the Ivory Coast, with food and beverage companies as the most
common culprits.15 Specifically, in 2005, several international
food and beverage companies failed to meet Harken-Engel
Protocol deadlines on the Ivorian cocoa farms that they
utilized.16 As a result, the International Labor Rights Forum
9 Alfred Babo, Child Labor in Cocoa-Growing Communities in Côte
D’Ivoire: Ways to Implement International Standards in Local Communities,
21 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 23, 25 (2014).
10 Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour arts. 1, 3, June
17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.
11 Ratifications of C182 – Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
(No.
182),
INT’L
LAB.
ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P1130
0_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327 (last visited May 11, 2021).
12 The
Harkin-Engel
Protocol,
SLAVE
FREE
CHOCOLATE,
https://www.slavefreechocolate.org/harkin-engel-protocol (last visited May 11,
2021).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.; see SLAVE FREE CHOCOLATE, supra note 7, which highlights that
“companies—including but not limited to Mars, Nestlé, Hershey, Cargill,
Cadbury, and Barry Callebaut—have admitted accountability” of their
involvement with child labor in cocoa production.
16 Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle I), 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064–67 (C.D. Cal.
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(ILRF), an organization that combats our world’s problems of
worker’s rights and labor standards, decided to take legal action
against these companies.17 The ILRF partnered with several
law firms across the nation, bringing forth causes of action under
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), and other state-related claims.18 At the time of
publication, this lawsuit has endured sixteen years of litigation
due to the various interpretations of the ATS during its
pendency.19 The ILRF has refused to back down from this suit
despite being sent back to the pleadings stage several times.
Part II of this case note discusses the ATS, its legislative
history, and the various noteworthy case law that has
interpreted the statute over time. Part III will discuss the scope
of aiding and abetting liability for violations of international law
and part IV will discuss the procedural history and legal
reasoning behind the decisions of Doe v. Nestle, S.A. over the
past sixteen years of litigation. Finally, this note will conclude
with a personal analysis and prediction regarding the next steps
of this case.
II.

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

Interestingly, the Alien Tort Statute “lacks a ‘legislative
history.’”20 Many legal scholars have referred to the statute’s
historical origins as “murky” and have found it difficult to
2010).
17 See Nestle Still Doesn’t Get It, INT’L LAB. RTS. F.: NEWS BLOG (Jan. 18,
2007), https://laborrights.org/blog/200701/nestle-still-doesnt-get-it, which
demonstrates the ILRF’s involvement in the Nestle child labor issue in the
Ivory Coast. For a full factual background of the lawsuit, see generally Nestle
I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1064–67.
18 See Nestle I, F. Supp. 2d at 1062–63. The other state-related claims
consisted of unjust enrichment, unfair competition, and other state-law
prohibited activities. Id. at 1063; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West
2020).
19 The initial lawsuit was filed on July 14, 2005, and the case has yet to
be resolved at the time of this article’s publication. Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at
1063; see Cargill, Inc. v. John DOE I, 141 S. Ct. 184 (2020); and Nestle U.S.A.,
Inc. v. John DOE I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020), wherein certiorari has been recently
granted.
20 William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the “Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 222
(1996).
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determine First Congress’s exact intentions.21 As a result,
scholarly inquiry is all we have to rely on. Pre-ATS, the States
retained full and independent sovereignty “in all matters not
expressly delegated to Congress,” which left Congress only with
the power to recommend certain actions be taken by the States.22
This posed great difficulty in the area of international law
because Congress’s lack of authority left them simply hoping
that State governments would comply with our nation’s
commitments under international law.23
One of Congress’s many concerns regarded violations of the
law of nations.24 At the time, the principal offenses against the
law of nations were violations of safe-conduct, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.25 Not only did Congress
wish to prevent these offenses from occurring but it was also
important that they maintain the nation’s reputation and
commitments to foreign countries at such early stages of our
country’s establishment;26 commitments State governments
often ignored.27 When the new Constitution was enacted,
Congress was finally given the power to do what it could only
previously recommend to the States regarding violations of the
law of nations.28 Soon thereafter, Oliver Ellsworth, a member of
the Continental Congress, drafted the Judiciary Act, which
incorporated these recommendations.29 The Act included a
provision, called the Alien Tort Clause, which granted federal
jurisdiction over torts in violation of the law of nations.30 Simply
put, the Alien Tort Clause was designed to provide aliens with
the opportunity to bring suit in federal court, rather than state
court.31 It was a likely motive of First Congress to provide a
21

Id.
Dodge, supra note 20, at 229–30.
23 STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10147, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 1 (2018).
24 Id.
25 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67.
26 MULLIGAN, supra note 23, at 1.
27 See id., regarding the States’ refusal to comply with the 1783 Treaty of
Peace with Great Britain, which required the elimination of any legal burdens
that prevented British citizens from collecting pre-Revolutionary War debts.
28 Dodge, supra note 20, at 231.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See id.
22
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federal forum to aliens due to the apprehension of possible
hostility by State courts toward aliens and their claims, and it
further allowed for a uniform interpretation of the law of
nations.32
The Alien Tort Clause was first revised when the clause
transitioned to Section 563 of the Revised Statutes of 1873.33 It
was again revised when the clause became Section 24 of the
Judiciary Act of March 3, 1911.34 It was revised for a final time
in 1948 as Section 1350 of Title 28 of the United States Code and
was renamed the Alien Tort Statute.35 Mostly, these revisions
simply clarified and tightened the statute’s language, without
any substantive changes.
The ATS was not invoked for nearly two hundred years.
Thus, with no legislative history or precedent, the statute has
been identified to have various theories derived by the many
legal scholars who have attempted to understand and interpret
the statute over time. The modern theory of the ATS is that
courts should interpret international law as it presently exists
among the nations of the world, not as was in 1789.36
Alternatively, the originalists theory is that modern human
rights should be excluded from the scope of the ATS and that the
statute should be limited to torts ordinarily in violation of the
law of nations at the time the statute was written, such as piracy
and torts against ambassadors.37 A similar theory considers
eighteenth-century “prize law,” a prevalent area of law during
the enactment of the ATS, to be the extent of the statute’s
scope.38 This theory interpreted the ATS as being designed
32 See Dodge, supra note 20, at 235–36, which highlights the writings of
John Jay and Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at
43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
33 Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 449 (1995).
34 Id.
35 Id. The Alien Tort Statute presently states: “The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for tort only, committed
in violation of the law of the nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350.
36 See Dodge, supra note 20, at 221–22.
37 Id. at 222–24.
38 Id. at 223.
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exclusively over a subcategory of prize law cases, such as suits
for torts committed during the capture of vessels, with the
exclusion of issues involving the vessel’s status as a “prize.”39 In
short, suits for a tort only.40 There is also the theory that the
statute simply provides a federal forum to foreigners and for
foreign affairs.41 Similarly, a final theory provides that the
statute was designed to preclude the denial of justice to aliens in
order to avoid any possible causes of war.42
A cause of action brought under the ATS did not enter U.S.
courtrooms until 1980. The subsequent portion of this case note
will describe how U.S. courts have interpreted cognizable causes
of action under the ATS, as well as the ATS’s scope concerning
corporate liability and extraterritorial application.
A. Claims That are Actionable Under the ATS
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (2d Cir. 1980)
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was the first case wherein a court
analyzed and permitted international citizens to bring suit
under the Alien Tort Statute.43 Dr. Joel and Dolly Filartiga
brought suit against a Paraguayan law enforcement official,
Americo Pena-Irala, for the wrongful death of their seventeenyear-old son by use of torturous conduct.44 After being unable to
justly pursue this matter in Paraguay because of the defendant’s
power position, plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court
while both parties temporarily resided in the United States on
visas.45 Initially, the matter was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.46 However, on appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that deliberate torture committed by an
official authority violated the unanimously accepted norms of
human rights under international law and, regardless of a
party’s nationality, they should be provided a means to seek
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Dodge, supra note 20, at 223.
Id.
Id. at 222–24.
See id. at 235.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 878.
Id. at 878–79.
Id. at 878.
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justice.47 The court further concluded that the ATS provides
alien parties with federal jurisdiction whenever an alleged
torturer is found and process is served in the United States. 48
The Second Circuit highlighted the universal interest in
protecting fundamental human rights and interpreted the ATS
as a federal platform for the adjudication of rights already
acknowledged by international law.49 The Filartiga decision was
“a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless
dream to free all people from brutal violence.”50 Ultimately, the
Filartiga decision clarified that the ATS provided for jurisdiction
over (1) tort actions; (2) specifically brought by aliens; and (3) for
violations of the law of nations only.51
2. Sosa v. Alvarez Machain (S. Ct. 2004)
Twenty-four years after the Filartiga decision, the Supreme
Court set forth requirements for bringing an action under the
ATS in the decision of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.52 Plaintiff,
Alvarez-Machain, claimed he was wrongfully captured and
arbitrarily detained in Mexico by the defendant, Sosa, a bounty
hunter operating as a United States agent.53 Sosa, who was
acting under the direction of the Drug Enforcement Agency,
captured Alvarez in Mexico and brought him to the United
States to be tried for the murder of a DEA agent.54 After Alvarez
was acquitted, he subsequently sued the United States for false
arrest under the Federal Tort Claims Act and sued Sosa
separately under the ATS.55 In his suit against Sosa, Alvarez
alleged violations of the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Declaration), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (Covenant), and customary

47

Id. at 880.
Id. at 878.
49 Id. at 884–85, 887, 890.
50 Id. at 890.
51 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 116 (2d
Cir. 2010) (discussing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890).
52 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
53 Id. at 698.
54 Id.
55 Id.
48
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international law for arbitrarily detaining him.56
The Supreme Court explained the ATS by expressly holding
that any ATS claim must be based on a universally recognized,
specifically defined rule of international law that is capable of
imposing obligations on international parties.57 In applying this
holding to Alvarez’s suit, the Court determined that his
arguments were based on definitions provided under the
Declaration and the Covenant, which were neither binding nor
imposed enforceable obligations on the federal court as a matter
of international law; the Declaration and the Covenant were
concluded as simply a set of principles.58 Moreover, the Court
reasoned that arbitrary arrest was not a prohibited customary
law and it did not rise to the level of a specifically defined,
binding international norm actionable under the ATS.59
The Sosa court established that not all international norms
are automatically actionable under the ATS because the ATS is
limited to a “narrow set of common law actions” derived from
international law.60 The Supreme Court further developed a
two-part analysis for determining the scope of this “narrow set”
of actions.61 The two-step test requires the norm to be: (1)
internationally accepted; and (2) defined with specificity.62
Additionally, the Court firmly added that courts have no
Congressional obligation to pursue and define new, and likely
debatable, law of nations violations.63 Simply put, the Supreme
Court held that the ATS was not designed to open federal courts
for just any international law violation and it further cautioned
56 Id. at 734–35; see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 9, ¶¶ 1, 5, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention[; n]o one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law[; . . . and a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest
or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”).
57 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26.
58 Id. at 734–35.
59 Id. at 734–38.
60 Id. at 721.
61 Id. at 725–26.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 728, 732.
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that it was not a statute for broad and evolving interpretation.64
3. Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank (2d Cir. 2007)
Three years after Sosa, Khulumani v. Barclay National
Bank was decided. This lawsuit incorporated several plaintiffs,
approximately fifty corporate defendants, and hundreds of
“corporate Does.”65
Plaintiffs contended that defendants
knowingly and actively collaborated with the South African
government to uphold an apartheid system, which favored and
benefited the minority white population over the majority black
African population in all areas of life.66 Plaintiffs brought suit
in federal district court under the ATS claiming that the
defendant corporations aided and abetted various international
law violations such as: apartheid; torture; extrajudicial killing;
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; denationalization;
unfair and discriminatory forced labor practice; and many
more.67
Defendants were both domestic and foreign
corporations.68 The district court recognized the probable
international conflict that would arise with South Africa from
these proceedings and, as a result, dismissed the complaint in
its entirety.69 One ground in support of dismissal was the failure
to establish subject matter jurisdiction because the scope of ATS
did not include aiding and abetting liability.70
On appeal, the Court considered the aiding and abetting
claim, as well as a significant preliminary question of whether
the proper legal standard should be derived from domestic law
or international law.71 The Khulumani court recognized that
international law was well-familiarized with the realm of aiding
and abetting liability, as it is an area of law commonly addressed
by many international tribunals.72 The Khulumani court
64

Id.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 259.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 260–61.
72 Id. at 270 (Katzmann, J., concurring). Aiding and abetting liability has
been authorized and applied as far back as the war crime trials following World
65
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determined that domestic and international law should not be
intertwined when international law provides a suitable
definition or means of remedy to maintain uniformity amongst
international disputes.73 Thus, Khulumani established that, so
long as aiding and abetting claims meet the two requirements of
Sosa, they can be brought under the ATS and are to be
considered under the international law standard of aiding and
abetting.74
B. Corporate Liability Under the ATS
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2d Cir. 2010)
In 2010, the Second Circuit decided Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum (Kiobel I), wherein Nigerian citizens who resided in
the United States brought suit in federal court under the ATS,
claiming that certain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations
aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in committing
violations of human rights through oil exploration and
production.75 The district court dismissed a majority of the
plaintiffs’ claims and an interlocutory appeal occurred.76 In
2010, there was still a great deal of unmarked territory
regarding ATS jurisprudence.77 Of the many unanswered
questions, Kiobel I presented the Second Circuit with one:
whether corporations could be sued under the ATS.78 To answer
this question, the court looked for guidance in various
international tribunals, searching for other nation’s conclusions
on the issue, which was found to be nonexistent. 79 As a result,
the court dismissed the complaint for plaintiffs' failure to
properly allege a claim under the ATS, holding that corporations
War II and has been accepted on a recurring basis ever since. Id. Such liability
is “recognized in numerous international treaties, most notably the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, and in the statutes creating the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).” Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 261–62.
75 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d
Cir. 2010).
76 Id. at 124.
77 Id. at 117.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 118.
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could not be sued under the ATS.80
2. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC (9th Cir. 2011)
Approximately one year after Kiobel I, the Ninth Circuit
addressed the issue of corporate liability under the ATS in Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC.81 Rio Tinto, an international mining company
headquartered in London, opened a mine in Papua New Guinea
(PNG) with the assistance of the PNG government.82 Certain
mining activities resulted in significant pollution of PNG
waterways and atmosphere, which threatened the health of
PNG’s residents.83 Residents attempted to close the mine but
Rio Tinto with the support of the PNG government, remained
open.84 This dispute led to a ten-year civil war, resulting in
thousands of deaths of PNG residents and serious health issues
to those who survived.85 In response, numerous PNG residents
brought suit in federal district court under the ATS against the
mining company for claims of: war crimes; racial discrimination;
violation of the rights to health, life, and security of the person;
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatments; international
environmental violations; and a consistent pattern of gross
human rights violations.86 This matter went before the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc panel twice.87 The plaintiffs’ second appeal,
under the direction of the court, regarded only claims for
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and racial
discrimination.88
Kiobel I was not binding on the Ninth Circuit, so the court
took it upon themselves to address the issue, determining that
two inquiries needed to be made: (1) whether the ATS barred all
corporate liability, and if it did not, was such liability limited to
individuals; and (2) if the ATS did not bar corporate liability,
80

Id. at 120.
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121–27 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1120.
87 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
88 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 743.
81
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whether the international norm in question recognized
corporate liability.89 Concerning the first inquiry, the en banc
panel adopted the view expressed by Judge Leval in his
concurring decision of Kiobel I, which stated that no opinion of
domestic or international law supported the conclusion that
claims actionable under the ATS only applied to natural persons
and not corporations, “leaving corporations [completely] immune
from suit and free to retain profits earned through such acts.”90
The panel further supported this view because the ATS
maintained no language nor legislative history to suggest a bar
of corporate liability or an intention of liability solely of natural
persons.91 Thus, the panel concluded there was no basis to hold
that such a limitation existed.92
The second inquiry required the court to analyze the specific
international norms included in plaintiffs’ claims—genocide and
war crimes.93 Relying on Sosa, the Ninth Circuit noted that each
norm allegedly violated in an ATS claim must be specific,
universal, and obligatory to be actionable under the ATS.94 The
panel then concluded that both genocide and war crimes met the
Sosa standard. 95 Furthermore, because international law
recognized both corporate liability and aiding and abetting
liability for both the norms of genocide and war crimes, plaintiffs
adequately alleged those claims.96 Appropriately, the panel
remanded those issues for further proceedings.97
Contrary to the Second Circuit’s holding in Kiobel I, the
Ninth Circuit stated that the absence of precedent regarding
corporate liability under the ATS did not automatically imply
that it was a legal impossibility.98 Ultimately, the en banc panel
89

Id. at 747.
Sarei, 550 F.3d at 747 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
(Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 153 (2d Cir. 2010)).
91 Id. at 747–48.
92 Id. at 748.
93 Id. at 744.
94 Id. at 743.
95 See id. at 758–67, for the court’s full discussion on genocide and war
crimes.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 770.
98 Id. at 761.
90
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established three principles regarding corporate liability under
the ATS:
First, the analysis proceeds norm-by-norm; there is no categorical
rule of corporate immunity or liability. Second, corporate liability
under an ATS claim does not depend on the existence of
international precedent enforcing legal norms against
corporations. Third, norms that are “universal and absolute,” or
applicable to “all actors,” can provide the basis for an ATS claim
against a corporation. To determine whether a norm is universal,
[it is] consider[ed], among other things, whether it is “limited to
states” and whether its application depends on the identity of the
perpetrator.99

3. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC (S. Ct. 2018)
Seven years after Sarei, the Supreme Court addressed
corporate liability under the ATS in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC;
specifically, foreign corporations.100 In Jesner, petitioners
brought suit under the ATS against defendant, Arab Bank, who
purportedly permitted certain bank officials to utilize and
transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East, resulting
in acts of terrorism that led to certain deaths and injuries.101
Initially, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings in
favor of Arab Bank and plaintiffs subsequently appealed.102 At
that time, both the district court and the Second Circuit were
bound by their previous decision of Koibel I, which barred
corporate liability under the ATS.103 As a result, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.104 Certiorari was
then granted to determine whether the Judiciary had the
authority to determine and enforce foreign corporate liability
under the ATS without the authorization from Congress.105
The Supreme Court upholds a strong position of respect
99

Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir.
2014) (citing Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747–48, 760–61, 764–65
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
100 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1389–90 (2018).
101 Id. at 1393.
102 Id. at 1386.
103 Id. at 1395.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1394.
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toward Congress and the Court’s precedents do not support the
authority of the Judiciary to extend or create causes of action in
domestic law.106
Furthermore, Congress preserves the
responsibility and capacity to weigh in on foreign policy
concerns.107 The Jesner case caused over a decade of political
tensions with Jordan—a critical ally of the United States—
because Jordan found the litigation to be disrespectful to its
sovereignty.108
Additionally,
Jordan
was
“a
key
counterterrorism partner,” particularly during the universal
movement against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.109 The
Court stressed that this was the exact foreign apprehension that
First Congress sought to avert when enacting the ATS.110
Therefore, because ATS litigation with foreign corporations has
such a critical effect on both foreign relations and the separation
of powers, the Court found it “inappropriate for courts to extend
ATS liability to foreign corporations.”111
C. Extraterritorial Application of the ATS
1. Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd. (S. Ct.
2010)
Our courts are often presented with the issue of whether a
federal law applies extraterritorially. In 2010, the Supreme
Court developed a solution to this problem by outlining a twopart analysis called the “focus test.”112 In Morrison v. National
Australian Bank Ltd., foreign investors brought a class action
against Australian National Bank for securities fraud involving
foreign transactions under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.113 The issue was whether the Securities
Exchange Act provided a cause of action for misconduct related
to securities traded extraterritorially on foreign exchanges.114
The Supreme Court developed the “focus test” as a means of
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 1402.
Id. at 1402–03.
Id. at 1406.
Id.
Id. at 1390.
Id. at 1403 (emphasis added).
See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
Id. at 250–53.
Id. at 250–51.
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statutory interpretation to determine whether statutes without
extraterritorial application can be applied to conduct that occurs
both domestically and abroad.115 Both parts of the “focus test”
require an inquiry into congressional concern—first, a court
must determine whether the statute was meant to apply
extraterritorially and, second, a court must determine the focus
of congressional concern in passing the statute.116 In Morrison,
the Court explained that the focus of the Securities Exchange
Act was the purchase and sale of securities and applied only to
domestic exchanges and transactions.117 Thus, the Act was not
meant to apply extraterritorially and plaintiffs did not have an
actionable claim.118
Ultimately, Morrison established the
“presumption against extraterritoriality,” which provides that a
statute cannot be applied extraterritorially if there is no clear
indication of such application.119
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (Kiobel II) (S. Ct.
2013)
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel I, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
extraterritoriality. Specifically, whether our courts can address
ATS claims for law of nations violations occurring outside of the
United States.120 In Kiobel II, the defendant corporations
asserted the presumption against extraterritoriality standard
established in Morrison.121 The Court highlighted that the
importance of the presumption against extraterritoriality was to
guarantee that the Judiciary did not inaccurately adopt a
certain interpretation of domestic law that carried “foreign
policy consequences not clearly intended by the [legislative]
branch.”122
By 2013, the Supreme Court had consistently cautioned
115

Id. at 264–65.
Id.
117 Id. at 266–67.
118 Id. at 266–68.
119 Id. at 255.
120 See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II), 569 U.S.
108 (2013).
121 Id. at 115.
122 Id. at 116.
116
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other courts to consider foreign policy concerns when
determining what claims could be brought under the ATS.123
This caution was based on the principle that United States law
does not rule the world.124 Ultimately, the Court affirmed that
the language of the ATS did not indicate extraterritorial
application.125 The Court pointed out that nothing immediately
before nor after the passage of the ATS provided support for the
notion that Congress enacted the ATS with the expectation of
actions arising from conduct occurring abroad.126 Furthermore,
there is no indication that the ATS was enacted to have the
United States regulate the world on international norms.127
In Kiobel II, plaintiffs’ allegations concerned conduct that
occurred outside of the United States.128 It was acknowledged
that some of the alleged conduct “touched and concerned”
territory of the United States; however, such conduct “must do
so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”129 “[M]ere corporate presence” was
not enough to satisfy that burden.130 Thus, Kiobel II established
that: (1) the ATS does not overcome the presumption against
extraterritorial application; and (2) that all relevant conduct
alleged in an ATS claim against a foreign corporation must take
place in the United States to be actionable.131

III.

SCOPE OF AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY FOR
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Aiding and abetting liability for violations of international
law is a well-known area of law in the Nuremberg Tribunals, the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, the Special Court for Sierra
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 120–21.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124–25.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 124–25.

17

278

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 33.2

Leone, and the United States.132
A. Actus Reus
The ICTY has constructed the most appropriate governing
rule of the actus reus component of aiding and abetting
violations of international law.133 This rule states that:
[A]n aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to
assist, encourage, or lend moral support to the perpetration of a
certain specific crime, which have a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime. The actus reus need not serve as
condition precedent for the crime and may occur before, during, or
after the principal crime has been perpetrated.134

In 2013, the ICTY clarified this rule, explaining that the
“specifically directed” requirement of aiding and abetting is
directed to “the ‘link’ between the assistance provided and the
principal offense, and requires that ‘assistance must be
“specifically”—rather than “in some way”—directed towards the
relevant crimes.’”135 United States’ courts have since adopted
and implemented this rule.136 Specifically, the district court for
the Southern District of New York indicated that an aider and
abettor’s assistance “must bear a causative relationship to the
specific wrongful conduct committed by the principal.”137 While
aider and abettor assistance need not be the “but-for” cause, it
must have an actual effect on the principal actor’s commission

132 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270–71 (2d Cir.
2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring).
133 Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
9,
2007),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf.
134 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
135 Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013, 1026 (9th Cir.
2014) (quoting Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 27, 37
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf).
136 See id.; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582
F.3d 244, 259 (2d. Cir. 2009); Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle I), 748 F. Supp. 2d
1057, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010); S. Afr. Apartheid Litig. v. Daimler, A.G., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 228, 257–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
137 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
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of a specific crime.138 Generalized assistance cannot sufficiently
sustain a claim of aiding and abetting; instead, two elements
must be met: (1) the assistance must be specifically directed or
bear a direct causative relationship to a specific wrongful act;
and (2) the assistance must have a substantial effect on that
wrongful act.139 To determine if these elements are met, a
context-specific, “fact-based inquiry” is required.140
When a plaintiff alleges aiding and abetting conduct in the
form of tacit approval and encouragement, such as plaintiffs in
Doe v. Nestle, S.A., the identification of the actus reus component
is not so clear-cut.141 Tacit approval and encouragement is a
theory of liability dating as far back as the era of the Nuremberg
Trials.142
Under modern case law, tacit approval and
encouragement liability requires “the combination of a position
of authority and physical presence at the crime scene[, which]
allow[s] the inference that non-interference by the accused
actually amounted to tacit approval and encouragement.”143
Additionally, it must still be shown that such approval and
encouragement
was
substantial,
which,
under
the
circumstances of this specific allegation, “requires . . . the
‘principal perpetrators [to be] aware of [the encouragement]’
because otherwise, the [approval] and encouragement would not
have had any effect (let alone a substantial one) on the principal
offense.”144

138

Id.
Id. at 1081–82.
140 Id. at 1081.
141 Id. at 1081–82.
142 Id. See, for example, United States v. Ohlendor (The Einsatzgruppen
Case), in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 570–72 (William S. Hein &
Co., Inc. 1997), which discusses the lack of the defendant’s specific
participation in the crimes at issue, but highlights his general involvement and
high-ranking position in the organization which did commit such crimes,
heavily contradicting the defendant’s argument of unawareness of the crime.
143 Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Judgment, ¶ 42 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
3,
2008),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/acjug/en/080703.pdf.
144 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (quoting Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case
No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, ¶ 277 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Apr. 3, 2007), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403e.pdf).
139
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B. Mens Rea
There has been an ongoing worldwide debate as to whether
the appropriate mens rea for aiding and abetting violations of
international law is knowledge or purpose. 145 The knowledge
standard dates back to the Nuremberg Tribunals in 1946.146
Additionally, in 1998, the ICTY concluded that the proper
standard is knowledge.147 Even more recently, in 2013, the
Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone affirmed
the knowledge standard. 148 The proper articulation of this
standard would be: “[t]he requisite mental element of aiding and
abetting is knowledge that the acts performed assist the
commission of the specific crime of the principal perpetrator.”149
More specifically, the aider and abettor must know or have
reason to know that her acts or omissions assisted in the
furtherance of the principal actor’s commission of the crime.150
145 Compare Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶
127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf
(applying knowledge standard), and Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR95-1-T,
Judgment,
¶
205
(May
21,
1999),
https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-1/trialjudgements/en/990521.pdf (applying knowledge standard), with Aziz v.
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying purpose standard).
146 See Zyklon B Case, in 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93–
102 (1947), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol1.pdf [hereinafter Zyklon B Case], which assesses the defendant’s guilt based
on his provision of poisonous gas to Nazis knowing of its ultimate unlawful
purpose.
147 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 249 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
10,
1998),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf, aff’d, Case
No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
July
21,
2000),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/furaj000721e.pdf.
148 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶ 483 (Sept.
26,
2013),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A1389.pdf.
149 Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
9,
2007),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf;
see Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgment, ¶ 370 (July 7,
2006),
https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-9946/trial-judgements/en/060707.pdf; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14A, Judgment, ¶ 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf.
150 Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim.
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The conclusion of knowledge as the mens rea standard for
aiding and abetting violations of international law poses a
problem for claims brought under the ATS. This is because the
knowledge standard is less-stringent and fails the Supreme
Court’s Sosa requirements of universality and definiteness.151
The International Court of Justice has refrained from making a
determination as to whether the proper standard of aiding and
abetting violations of international law is knowledge or purpose
when considering crimes of genocide; however, Nuremberg-era
precedents support the purpose standard.152 Moreover, the
Second and Fourth Federal U.S. Circuits have adopted the
purpose standard in reliance on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which is further in support of the
purpose standard.153
IV.

DOE V. NESTLE, S.A.

A. The Pleadings Stage
On July 14, 2005, the International Labor Rights Forum
(ILRF) filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California against several multi-billion dollar
international companies, such as: Nestle, S.A.; Nestle, U.S.A.;
Nestle, Ivory Coast; Archer Daniels Midland Co.; Cargill, Inc.;
Cargill Cocoa; Cargill West Africa, S.A.; and ten other
“Corporate Does.”154 This class action was filed on behalf of
plaintiffs: John Doe I, John Doe II, John Doe III, and Global

Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
3,
2008),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/acjug/en/080703.pdf.
151 Id.
152 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶
421–24 (Feb. 26), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226JUD-01-00-EN.pdf, where the court declined to decide whether the crime of
aiding and abetting genocide required the sharing of or simply knowing of the
principal’s criminal intent.
153 Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399–401 (4th Cir. 2011);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d
Cir. 2009); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, ¶ 3(c),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
154 Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle I), 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
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Exchange.155 Does I–III are Malian children who were forced to
labor on the Ivory Coast cocoa fields, and their class status
extended to all similarly situated Malian children.156 The ILRF
chose to sue in the United States not only because it was
probable that this lawsuit would elicit a potentially harmful
response in Africa but, because of the infamously corrupt judicial
system in Cote D’Ivoire, it was assumed that any claims brought
against corporations which brought significant revenue into the
country would likely be ignored.157 Further, no law existed in
Mali allowing civil damages for injuries caused by non-Malian
parties.158
Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted allegations regarding the
aiding and abetting of slavery, forced labor, child labor, torture,
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the continuance
of exclusive supplier/buyer relationships with farmers in Cote
d’Ivoire who utilized child slave labor.159 Plaintiffs proclaimed
that the exclusive contractual agreements defendants had with
the Ivorian farmers allowed them to dictate the terms of
production and supply, which included labor conditions.160
Specifically, that defendants maintained strong control over the
Ivorian farmers through their provision of ongoing financial
support, including advanced payments and personal spending
money to keep their loyalty as exclusive suppliers; farming
supplies, including fertilizer, tools, and other equipment;
training in particular growing and fermentation techniques and
general farm maintenance, including appropriate labor practices
to increase the quality and quantity of cocoa beans.161
Furthermore, defendants’ oversight of the farms required
training and quality control visits numerous times per year.162
155 Id. Global Exchange is a San Francisco-based human rights
organization that promotes international social justice. See Our Vision &
Mission, GLOB. EXCH., https://globalexchange.org/about-us/mission/ (last
visited May 12, 2021). Global Exchange brought only one cause of action, so
“plaintiffs” refers solely to the “Does.” Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 n.1.
156 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1063–64.
157 Id. at 1064.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1064–65.
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As such, plaintiffs asserted that defendants maintained firsthand knowledge of the child slave labor occurring on such farms
because of their ongoing presence there.163
In December of 2005, three of the defendant corporations––
Archer Daniels Midland Company, Nestle, U.S.A., and Cargill,
Inc.––moved to dismiss ILRF’s complaint.164
Defendants
challenged plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their alleged
knowledge of the purported child slave labor and argued that the
farmers were the perpetrators of the criminal acts of which they
were not involved.165 The defendant corporations argued that,
according to Sosa, corporate liability did not come within the
scope of claims actionable under the ATS, nor did the
international norm of child labor come within the narrow class
of international law norms cognizable under the ATS.166
Defendants further proclaimed that to impose the unreasonable
obligation of corporations to oversee and prevent any wrongful
act committed in the production of goods would be not only
outrageous and overly burdensome to corporations but seriously
detrimental to the global economy.167
The district court held that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to
allege specific conduct amounting to the assistance or
encouragement of child slave labor by the defendants nor were
there sufficient allegations of any conduct that had a substantial
effect in the commission of the supposed crime.168 The court
further determined that the complaint failed to assert that
defendants maintained the required mens rea in assisting the
Ivorian farm owners’ wrongful acts.169 Accordingly, plaintiffs
163

Id. at 1066.
See generally Notice of Mot. And Mot. of Defs. Archer-Daniels-Midland
Co.; Nestle, U.S.A.; and Cargill, Inc. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compl. Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim for Which Relief Can Be
Granted, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV05-5133-SVW), 2005 WL 4134362 [hereinafter Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 2010].
165 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 2010, supra note 164, at 6.
166 Id. at 7.
167 Id. at 2.
168 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (relying on Prosecutor v. Blagojević,
Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia
May
9,
2007),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf).
169 Id.
164
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were given the opportunity to amend their complaint to add the
necessary factual support to their aiding and abetting claims,
which they did in July of 2009.170 Shortly thereafter, defendants
moved to dismiss the amended complaint and asserted that
plaintiffs still had not alleged conduct sufficient to hold them
liable for aiding and abetting under the ATS.171 The matter then
proceeded for oral argument.
B. Nestle I (C.D. Cal. 2010)
Following oral argument, on September 8, 2010, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California issued
the first of many decisions in this matter; five years after the
initial complaint was filed.172 At that time, the district court was
bound by Sosa, and, because all named defendants were
corporations, the court dismissed the ATS claims.173
1. The Aiding and Abetting Claim: Actus Reus
Component
Plaintiffs described three types of activities to support their
aiding and abetting allegations: (1) financial assistance; (2)
provision of farming supplies, technical assistance, and training;
and (3) failure to exercise economical leverage.174 Alternatively,
defendants interpreted those allegations as five separate
categories: (1) financial assistance; (2) providing farming
supplies and technical farming assistance; (3) providing training
in labor practices; (4) failing to exercise economic leverage; and
(5) lobbying the United States government to avoid a mandatory
labeling scheme.175 Because the burden to plead sufficient facts
to the court was on the plaintiffs, the court adopted their
interpretation and addressed each activity separately.176

170 Id. at 1063; Pls. First Am. Class Action Compl. for Inj. Relief and
Damages, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV05-5133-SVW), 2009 WL 2921081 [hereinafter Pls.’ First Am. Compl.].
171 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1063; Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 2010, supra
note 164, at 12.
172 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1057.
173 Id. at 1125, 1130, 1144–45.
174 Id. at 1098.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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a. Financial Assistance
Plaintiffs maintained the position that defendants provided
the Ivorian farmers with monetary incentives, including
advanced payments and personal spending money, to build
loyalty, to retain an exclusive buyer/supplier relationship, and
to keep the cost of cocoa beans cheap.177 Plaintiffs submitted
that this ongoing financial support provided the farmers with
enticements to employ slave labor.178 The court determined that
the defendants’ ongoing financial support was merely part of a
commercial transaction, which, without more, could not satisfy
the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting under
international law.179 The court reasoned that plaintiffs did not
explicitly assert that defendants provided large sums of money
to the Ivorian farmers in furtherance of or in encouragement of
child labor, forced labor, or the like.180 The four corners of
plaintiffs’ complaint only supported that the defendants’
payments to the Ivorian farmers were simply in exchange for
cocoa beans, to secure future cocoa supplies, and to maintain the
farmers’ loyalty as exclusive suppliers.181 Thus, the allegation
concerning financial assistance was unsuccessful.182
b. Providing Farming Supplies, Technical
Assistance, and Training
With regard to the provision of farming supplies, technical
assistance, and training, plaintiffs submitted that the defendant
corporations conducted training and quality control visits
several times per year, provided technical assistance in crop
production, and provided technical assistance regarding new
strategies to deal with crop infestation and income generation.183
Specifically, the corporations provided the farmers with the
knowledge, tools, and support they needed to maintain
177

Id.
Id. at 1099 (quoting Pls.’ Suppl. Mem. of Points and Authorities in
Resp. to Ct.’s Order Dated June 11, 2009 and in Further Opp’n to Mot. to
Dismiss at 14–15, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(No. CV-05-5133-SVW), 2009 WL 2921078 [hereinafter Pls.’ Suppl. Mem.]).
179 Id. at 1099–100.
180 Id. at 1100.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 34, 36–38).
178
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successful farms.184 This included providing research and
schooling regarding the latest and best cocoa farming
techniques.185
Plaintiffs asserted that this support
demonstrated that defendants “provid[ed] . . . the necessary
means . . . to carry out slave labor” because their actions
provided “logistical support and supplies essential to continuing
the forced labor and torture.”186
Unfortunately, the district court found plaintiffs’
arguments fruitless.187
Similar to the court’s reasoning
concerning financial assistance, plaintiffs’ allegations needed to
be specifically directed to the assistance or encouragement of the
commission of a particular crime, or they needed to assert
conduct that had a “substantial effect” on the specific crimes of
forced labor, child labor, torture, and cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment.188 The court explained that sufficient
allegations would have been the defendants’ provision of guns
and whips that were used to threaten, intimidate, or force the
child slave labor, or providing the farmers with training on how
to utilize guns and whips, or how to deprive children of food and
water and other means of psychological abuse and torture.189
Those types of specific allegations are required to adequately
give rise to the aiding and abetting of international law
violations.190 Plaintiffs’ complaint merely asserted that the
defendant corporations assisted the Ivorian farmers in the act of
growing crops and managing their business.191 The complaint
was ultimately silent of any substantial assistance in forced
labor, child labor, torture, or cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment.192
c. Failure to Exercise Economic Leverage
Lastly, plaintiffs contended that, because defendant
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 40–41).
Id. (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 40–41).
Id. (quoting Pls.’ Suppl. Mem., supra note 178, at 17–18).
Id.
Id. at 1100–01.
Id. at 1101.
Id.
Id. at 1102.
Id.
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corporations obtained economic leverage over the Ivorian region
and their exclusive supplier/buyer agreements with the farmers,
they each maintained the ability to control and/or limit the use
of forced child labor by the supplier farms from which they
purchased their cocoa beans.193 The district court analyzed
these allegations under the “omissions, moral support, and tacit
approval and encouragement” theory, which fell outside the
definitive scope of aiding and abetting liability under
international law and was ultimately an undefined area of
law.194 The court looked to legal authority from the ICTY and
ICTR, and, although it found conclusions regarding omissions,
moral support, and tacit approval and encouragement under
aiding and abetting, the court felt that this area of law was “too
unclear to satisfy Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and
universality.”195 Nevertheless, the court did note four significant
observations regarding this area of law:
First, one must attempt to distinguish omissions, moral support,
and tacit approval and encouragement from the concept of
“command responsibility,” which “holds a superior responsible for
the actions of subordinates. . . .”196 Second, an “omission” or
“failure to act” only gives rise to aiding and abetting liability “if
there is a legal duty to act. . . .” 197 Third, it must be emphasized
that aiding and abetting by way of “moral support” and “tacit
approval and encouragement” is a rare breed (and, in fact, a nonexistent breed for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute).198 [Finally,]
it is important to note that all of the “moral support” cases involve
a defendant who held formal military, political, or administrative

193

Id. (citing Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶ 48).
Id.
195 Id. at 1103; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-A,
Judgment,
¶¶
201–02
(June
1,
2001),
https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-1/appealschamber-judgements/en/010601.pdf (affirming the trial court’s finding of guilt
via tacit encouragement based on defendant’s position of authority and failure
to oppose the crime).
196 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
103 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996)).
197 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Judgment, ¶
134 & n.481 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrksic/acjug/en/090505.pdf).
198 Id. at 1105.
194
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authority.199

In other words, the responsibility for international law
violations could extend beyond the principal actor to anyone
with higher authority who authorized, tolerated, or knowingly
ignored those acts.200 However, for purposes of the ATS, liability
was only recognized “in cases where the duty to act arises from
an obligation imposed by criminal laws or the laws and customs
of war.”201 Aside from establishing the four important points
listed above, the court concluded that the actus reus of “moral
support” and “tacit approval and encouragement” were not
adequately well-defined and universally accepted, as required
by Sosa, to be an actionable norm under international law.202
Plaintiffs attempted to argue that defendants’ conduct
should have been viewed as a whole because despite the conduct
being unactionable individually, it rose to an actionable level
when viewed in totality.203 The court overwhelmingly concluded
that plaintiffs’ allegations only provided that the defendants
were purchasing and assisting in the production of cocoa.204 All
that plaintiffs demonstrated to the court was simple commercial
transactions between the defendant corporations and the
Ivorian farmers.205 Much more was required to show, both
individually and as a whole, that defendants’ had “a material
and direct effect” on the forced labor, child labor, torture, or
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by the Ivorian
farmers.206 As a result, the actus reus component was not met.207
2. The Aiding and Abetting Claim: Mens Rea
Component
Despite plaintiffs’ failure to adequately allege the actus reus
component of aiding and abetting liability, the court
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Id.; see, e.g., Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-A ¶¶ 201–02, 293–94.
Hilao, 103 F.3d at 777.
Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1109–10.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nevertheless continued to consider the mens rea component.
Plaintiffs’ mens rea allegations asserted that the defendants’
long-term relationship with the farmers, which included
occasional physical contact, reflected an awareness of the labor
problems that were present.208 Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted
that defendants made public representations of their concern
regarding the child labor epidemic and took affirmative actions
to reduce it on the farms they worked with.209 Plaintiffs’
ultimate contention was that, based on those efforts and actions,
defendants knew or reasonably should have known that childlabor abuse occurred on the Ivorian farms, arguing knowledge
as the proper standard.210
The court disagreed with plaintiffs’ position regarding the
knowledge standard and stated that plaintiffs needed to show
that defendants “intended and desired to substantially assist the
Ivorian farmers” in acts contributing to the child slave labor,
which their allegations did not.211 Even under the mens rea
standard of knowledge, the court could not wholly conclude that
defendants maintained first-hand knowledge that their actions
specifically contributed to the child slave labor that occurred.212
The court specified that plaintiffs’ allegations failed to raise a
claim of reasonable inference that the defendants knew or
should have known that their provision of money, training, tools,
and tacit encouragement further assisted the criminal acts
committed by the Ivorian farmers.213 Further, plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that defendants either knew that their conduct
would substantially assist, or that defendants intended for their
conduct to substantially assist, torturous child slave labor.214
Plaintiffs’ allegations, and their conceivable inferences, only
indicated that defendants knew about the universal problem of

208
209

55).

Id. (citing Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 34, 38).
Id. (citing Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶¶ 45–46, 51, 54–

210

Id.
Id. at 1111.
212 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A,
Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf).
213 Id.
214 See id.
211
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child labor on certain cocoa farms in Cote d’Ivoire.215
Consequently, the absence of adequate allegations of
defendants’ purpose or intent in assisting the specific crimes
asserted against them, the mens rea component was similarly
not satisfied.216 Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the
claims of aiding and abetting were granted for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.217
3. The Agency Theory Claim
As an alternative theory, plaintiffs attempted to hold
defendants liable under an agency theory, asserting that the
defendants were principals of the Ivorian farmers.218 The court
quickly terminated this argument.219 Most significantly, the
court emphasized that plaintiffs’ contentions erroneously relied
on domestic agency law because international law provided a
more appropriate body of law.220 The court stressed that, per
Sosa, domestic law is only to be utilized when international law
is silent on the topic.221 Furthermore, even if domestic agency
law was appropriate, plaintiffs cited case law regarding agency
relationships completely unrelated to the relationships between
defendants and the Ivorian farmers in the case at bar, and were
thus deficient.222
4. The Torture Victim Protection Act Claim
In addition to their ATS claim, plaintiffs alleged that
defendant corporations aided and abetted acts of torture under
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).223 The TVPA forbids
“[any] individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation [to] subject[] an[other]
individual to torture.”224 Because the TVPA is a statutory cause
of action, the court acknowledged the appropriate analysis was
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1111–13.
Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1113–14.
Id. at 1118 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(1)).
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to be derived from federal law––unlike the ATS, which is
analyzed under international law––and is thus a matter of
statutory interpretation.225 However, the court refrained from
conducting such an analysis and, instead, granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the TVPA claim for the same
reason it dismissed plaintiffs’ other claims: failure to establish
plausible allegations of torture or any action under color of law,
as required for a finding of liability under the TVPA.226 The fact
that Congress had not extended TVPA liability to corporations
further supported this decision.227
5. The State-Law Claims
Lastly, plaintiffs asserted four claims under California law:
breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and unfair
business practices.228 Due to an analogous Ninth Circuit
decision, plaintiffs abandoned the breach of contract and
negligence claims.229 With regard to the unjust enrichment
claim, plaintiffs alleged that the farm’s reliance on forced labor
greatly reduced labor costs, which allowed defendants to receive
benefits by purchasing cocoa beans for such significantly low
prices.230 The court also noted relevant case law that established
that the lack of a prior relationship between a plaintiff and a
defendant precluded claims of unjust enrichment because the
relationship was too attenuated to support such a claim.231 In
the case at bar, plaintiffs did not identify any relevant authority
225

Id. at 1115–16.
Id. at 1120.
227 Id. at 1116.
228 Id. at 1120.
229 Id. at 1120–21; see Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 685
(9th Cir. 2009), wherein the court held that corporations have no legal duty
under the common law principles of negligence when it comes to the
substandard labor principles of their suppliers.
230 Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra
note 170, ¶¶ 90–91).
231 Id. “The fact that one person benefits another is not, by itself, sufficient
to require restitution.” First Nationwide Sav. v. Perry, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173,
176 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). “The person receiving the benefit is required to
make restitution only if the circumstances are such that, as between the two
individuals, it is unjust for the person to retain it.” Id. See, for example, WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d at 685, where the court concluded that, because the
plaintiff was not an employee of the defendant, the plaintiff had no place to
assert unjust enrichment based on the defendant’s alleged substandard labor
practices.
226
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to support their allegation that the long-term exclusive
relationships between the defendant corporations and the
Ivorian farmers were adequate to fulfill the “prior relationship”
condition required for unjust enrichment claims.232 Accordingly,
this claim was dismissed.233
Concerning the unfair business practice allegation,
plaintiffs claimed that defendants “engaged in fraudulent and
deceptive business practices by making materially false
misrepresentations and omissions” to create the impression that
they were addressing the problem of child slave labor when, in
fact, they were not.234 Plaintiffs further argued that defendants
engaged in unfair business practices by utilizing and supporting
forced child labor.235 Ultimately, the court determined that
plaintiffs did not express any theory, or provide any legal
authority, through which the child slave plaintiffs were injured
by defendants’ specific California-based conduct, nor was it
explained how the alleged conduct––such as the false and
misleading statements––adversely affected the child slave
plaintiffs.236 Accordingly, this claim was also dismissed.237
After this devastating loss and a full complaint dismissal,
plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit in June of 2011.238
C. First Appeal – Nestle II (9th Cir. 2014)
The Ninth Circuit addressed three issues in this appeal:
1. Did the district court err in determining that private
corporations are not subject to civil tort liability under the ATS? 2.
Did the district court err in failing to apply the federal common
law standard for civil aiding and abetting liability to Plaintiffs’
ATS claims? 3. Even if international law applied to Plaintiffs’
232

Nestle I, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. (quoting Pls.’ First Am. Compl., supra note 170, ¶ 96).
236 Id. at 1122–23.
237 Id. at 1123.
238 See generally Appellants’ Opening Br., Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc.
(Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 2:05-cv-05133-SVW-JTL), 2011
WL 2617616.
233
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aiding and abetting claims, did the district court use the correct
international law standard?239

Plaintiffs consistently maintained their position that the
defendant corporations aided and abetted slave labor “by
providing financial and non-financial assistance to cocoa
farmers in the Ivory Coast.”240 In opposition, defendants argued
three main points: (1) there is no specific, universal, and
obligatory norm preventing corporations from aiding and
abetting slave labor; (2) plaintiffs’ complaint, again, failed to
allege the actus reus and mens rea elements of the aiding and
abetting claim; and (3) plaintiffs’ complaint improperly sought
extraterritorial application of federal law contrary to Kiobel II.241
1. The Alien Tort Claim
Between 2010 and 2014, from the dismissal of plaintiffs’
amended complaint to the decision of their appeal, the Kiobel I,
Kiobel II, and Sarei decisions were published.242 Sarei, a
decision from the Ninth Circuit’s own en banc panel, and Kiobel
II, a Supreme Court decision, were thus both binding precedent
on this appeal. In applying the norm-by-norm analysis adopted
in Sarei, the Nestle II court concluded that the prohibition
against slavery is a universal norm; however, it could not be
asserted against the defendant corporations because the scope
of the ATS did not (at this time) extend to corporations.243
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court acknowledged that
corporations were not exempt from acts of enslavement and the
prohibition of slavery applied to all actors––both state and nonstate––because it would be a contradiction to the humanitarian
and moral nature of the prohibition to conclude that
corporations are immune from liability of any form of slavery.244
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
239
240

2014).

Id. at 3–4.
Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir.

241

Id.
See discussion supra Parts II(B)(i)–(ii), II(C)(ii), for
information on these cases.
243 Nestle II, 766 F.3d at 1022.
244 Id.
242
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its opinion.245
The Ninth Circuit refrained from addressing defendants’
extraterritoriality argument because, although Kiobel II had
just been decided, too much was still left unanswered.246 It is
common practice for courts to allow plaintiffs to amend their
complaints when changes in the law occur.247 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit directed plaintiffs to amend their complaint in
light of the Kiobel II decision, which required plaintiffs to add
allegations of activity that occurred within the United States to
overcome defendants’ extraterritoriality argument.248
The
Ninth Circuit recognized that such an amendment would be
possible because, based on the record before them, certain
conduct underlying plaintiffs’ claims had occurred in the United
States.249 However, plaintiffs’ current complaint failed to
adequately explain such conduct to sufficiently fulfill those
allegations.250 For the district court to effectively and fully
consider the accuracy of plaintiffs’ counter-arguments on
remand, it was justified to allow amendment of their
complaint.251
2. The Aiding and Abetting Claim: Mens Rea
Component
On appeal, plaintiffs maintained their mens rea argument
that the standard for an aiding and abetting claim was
knowledge.252 Although the circuits remained divided as to the
appropriate standard, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
history of the knowledge standard in other international
tribunals.253 The court decided that it was not necessary for
245

Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1027–28.
247 Id. at 1028.
248 Id. at 1028–29.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 1023.
253 Id.; see generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A,
Judgment,
¶
483
(Sept.
26,
2013),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A1389.pdf; Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 137 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
9,
2007),
246
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them to decipher which standard was appropriate because
plaintiffs’ allegations nevertheless satisfied the more rigorous
standard of purpose.254
The Ninth Circuit read plaintiffs’ allegations in their favor
and determined that a logical inference arose that the defendant
corporations would likely supersede basic human welfare for
increased revenues and intend to pursue any and all
opportunities to reduce their costs for purchasing cocoa.255 The
court felt that, driven by such a goal, it was probable that
defendants encouraged child slavery because it was the cheapest
form of labor available and would thus be most profitable, as
plaintiffs alleged.256
Therefore, plaintiffs’ allegations did
properly explain how the defendants benefited from the use of
child slavery, how child slavery furthered defendants’
operational goals, and how defendants acted with purpose to
further child slavery.257 Moreover, the court recognized that the
defendants’ control over the Ivory Coast cocoa market further
supported that they acted with purpose to facilitate child slavery
because they did not use their control to stop it and continued to
offer support and provide supplies that further enabled it.258
The Ninth Circuit indicated that defendants maintained the
means to prevent or decrease child slavery and, because they did
not do so, their purpose in continuing child slavery was
demonstrably supported.259 Despite these conclusions, the court
recognized that doing business with child slave owners did not
solely establish a purpose to support child slavery.260 But,
specifically, it was defendants’ support of the use of child slavery
to minimize production costs that clearly translated to the use
of child slavery in order to pursue a goal of profitability—

https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 205 (May 25,
1999),
https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-951/trial-judgements/en/990521.pdf; Zyklon B Case, supra note 146.
254 Nestle II, 766 F.3d at 1024.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 1024–25.
259 Id. at 1025.
260 Id.
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something that could only be done with purpose. 261 The mens
rea requirement was therefore satisfied and the district court’s
decision on this issue was reversed.262
3. The Aiding and Abetting Claim: Actus Reus
Component
The parties agreed, and as required by international law,
that the assistance an aider and abettor provides to a principal
actor must be substantial.263 However, the parties did not agree
on whether such assistance must be “specifically directed”
towards the commission of the crime.264 After reviewing the
relevant international case law which supported and opposed
the “specifically directed” requirement, the Ninth Circuit
determined that “there [was] less focus on specific direction and
more of an emphasis on the existence of a causal link between
the defendants and the commission of the crime.”265 Despite this
revelation, the court declined to adopt a particular actus reus
standard for aiding and abetting under the ATS.266 Instead, the
Ninth Circuit remanded the matter and held that plaintiffs
should be afforded the opportunity to amend their actus reus
claims and their ATS claim in light of two recent international
decisions which further defined the actus reus standard for
violations of international law, as discussed supra in Part
III.A.267
After Nestle II was decided in September of 2015,
defendants submitted a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
261

Id. at 1025–26.
Id. at 1026.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 1026–27; see Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A,
Judgment,
¶
390
(Sept.
26,
2013),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A1389.pdf, which explains that the aiding and abetting of violations of
international law require a direct and specific link between the assistance and
the commission of the crime; and Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A,
Judgment, ¶¶ 27, 126 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28,
2013),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf,
which explains that aiding and abetting conduct must have a substantial effect
on the commission of the crime.
262
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to
determine:
1. Whether a defendant is subject to suit under the ATS for aiding
and abetting another person’s alleged violation of the law of
nations based on allegations that the defendant intended to pursue
a legitimate business objective while knowing (but not intending)
that the objective could be advanced by the other person’s violation
of international law. 2. Whether the “focus” test of Morrison v.
National Australian Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010), governs
whether a proposed application of the ATS would be impermissibly
extraterritorial under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013). 3. Whether there is a well-defined internationallaw consensus that corporations are subject to liability for
violations of the law of nations.268

The petition was denied on January 11, 2016.269 At that point,
this matter had been pending for six years, and the ILRF was
preparing its third complaint.
D. Nestle III (C.D. Cal. 2017)
To sufficiently file a comprehensive amended complaint,
plaintiffs moved for a limited jurisdictional discovery exchange
in March of 2016, which was granted by the district court.270
Subsequently, plaintiffs were faced by a second motion to
dismiss premised on two main arguments: (1) the ATS could not
be applied extraterritorially, which plaintiffs assert by including
conduct that occurred outside the United States; and (2)
plaintiffs still did not sufficiently allege the actus reus
component of their aiding and abetting claim.271 In rendering a
decision, the court applied the Morrison “focus test” to the claims
at issue, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s prior rejection of
the test.272
268

Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at i, Nestle U.S.A., Inc, v. Doe, 136 S. Ct. 798
(2016) (No. 15-349), 2015 WL 5530188.
269 Nestle U.S.A., Inc. v. Doe I, 577 U.S. 1062 (2016).
270 See generally Mot. to Allow Pls. to Conduct Jurisdictional Disc., Doe I
v. Nestle, S.A., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 2:05-cv-05133-SVW-MRW),
2016 WL 1546527.
271 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss 2010, supra note 164, at 3–18.
272 Nestle v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle III), No. CV 05-5133-SVW-MRW, 2017
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The court specified that the conduct at issue in this case was
forced child labor and that the “focus” was defendants conduct
that aided and abetted such forced child labor on the Ivorian
Coast.273 The court conducted a further analysis by first
isolating the relevant conduct that was alleged to constitute
defendants’ aiding and abetting of forced child labor and then by
determining if all relevant conduct took place outside the United
States.274 The court reasoned that, if the answer to the latter
question was yes, the case was to be dismissed. 275 However, “[i]f
some relevant conduct took place in the United States, it must
‘touch and concern’ the United States with ‘sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.’” 276 The
court then addressed plaintiffs’ allegations concerning
defendants’ conduct that “touched and concerned” the United
States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.277 This was done in five separate parts:
(1) U.S. based decision-making; (2) the provision of funds
originating in the U.S.; (3) the U.S. companies furnishing
“additional supplies” and “extensive training” to cocoa fanners [sic]
in Cote d’Ivoire; (4) publishing statements in the U.S. that
Defendants are against child slavery; and (5) lobbying efforts in
the U.S. against a bill that Plaintiffs allege “would have required
Defendants’ import cocoa to be “slave free.”278

Because certain conduct by the defendants took place within the
United States, the court was required to analyze further.279 In
doing so, the court determined that the first three allegations
were all ordinary activities of international businesses and did
not “touch and concern” the United States with any weight more
than mere citizenship.280 These particular allegations only
WL 6059134, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2017).
273 Id. at *3.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II), 569 U.S.
108, 125 (2013)).
277 Id. at *4.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
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showed that defendants maintained business relationships with
foreign parties and nothing suggested that defendants planned
or directed the underlying violations in any way.281
The court likewise did not agree with plaintiffs’ fourth
allegation.282 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants published false
assurances to consumers, which deluded them of the reality that
defendants were actually supporting child slave labor.283
Specifically, these publications stated that defendants were
against child labor and that they held their suppliers to high
standards, including compliance with the prohibition of child
labor.284 The court determined these allegations were not
relevant conduct under the “focus test” because they did not
adequately explain how the statements were fraudulent, and the
court therefore deemed them conclusory.285 As mentioned, the
allegations did not show that the alleged publications assisted
the defendants in committing forced child labor in any way, nor
did plaintiffs provide any legal authority to support that
publications that inform the public of an international human
rights violation translates to the aiding and abetting of that
violation.286
Plaintiffs’ fifth allegation asserted that defendants conduct
“touched and concerned” the United States by the millions of
dollars spent within the United States “lobbying to destroy a bill
that . . . would have required Defendants’ imported cocoa to be
‘slave free.’”287 However, similar to plaintiffs’ first four claims,
plaintiffs did not plausibly allege how such lobbying efforts
specifically aided and abetted the Ivorian farmers to sufficiently
displace the presumption.288 As such, the court determined that
plaintiffs’ allegations were not relevant conduct under the “focus
test.”289
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289

Id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the court concluded that the only nexus between
plaintiffs’ claims and the United States was the fact that
defendants were United States corporations, which was not a
sufficient factor.290 The court did not find, nor did plaintiffs
provide, any case law to support the argument that the large size
of defendant corporations was to be considered a relevant factor
under this, or any, ATS test.291 The court ultimately found that
plaintiffs’ complaint sought a barred extraterritorial application
of the ATS.292 As a result of this finding, the court did not reach
the merits of plaintiffs’ actus reus claims.293 Defendants’ motion
to dismiss was granted without leave to amend.294 The court did
not grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint because
plaintiffs were already given ample opportunities, among other
procedural aspects, to adequately adjust their complaint.295 The
court determined that further amendment would not serve any
fruitful purpose.296 Nevertheless, plaintiffs refused to back
down, and again appealed to the Ninth Circuit.297 By that time,
litigation had entered its twelfth year.
E. Second Appeal – Nestle IV (9th Cir. 2019)
Since the Ninth Circuit decided Nestle II, the Supreme
Court published the Jesner decision, which created a shift in the
“legal landscape” of the ATS and required portions of the Nestle
II decision to be reconsidered.298 The decision was divided into
four main parts: (1) corporate liability post-Jesner; (2) the
extraterritorial ATS claim; (3) the aiding and abetting claim;
and (4) plaintiffs standing to bring such claims.299

290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299

Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle IV), 929 F.3d 623, 639 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 639, 642.
Id. at 639–42.
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1. Corporate Liability Post-Jesner
In Nestle II, the Ninth Circuit held that the prohibition of
slavery was universal, and thus “applicable to all actors,
including corporations.”300 However, since then, the Supreme
Court explicitly held in Jesner that foreign corporations could
not be sued under the ATS.301 Accordingly, Nestle II’s holding
was null as to the foreign defendant corporations but upheld as
applied to the domestic defendant corporations.302
2. The Extraterritoriality Claim
Defendants main argument was that the court was
required to use the “focus test,” and the court agreed.303 With
regard to the first step in the extraterritoriality analysis, as
established in Kiobel II, the ATS maintained a presumption
against extraterritoriality, and nothing in the statute rebutted
that presumption.304 The next step in the analysis, the court
determined, necessitated an inquiry into “a domestic application
of the statute,” which required a look into its focus.305
Defendants asserted that conduct occurring within the United
States was immaterial because the focus of extraterritoriality
should be on the location where the principal offense or injury
occurred, rather than where the aiding and abetting took
place.306 The court disagreed and held that “[t]he focus of the
ATS is not limited to principal offenses.”307 The court then
proceeded to determine whether there was any domestic conduct
relevant to plaintiffs’ ATS claim.308 In doing so, the court
concluded that the conduct mentioned in plaintiffs’ complaint
was both specific and domestic because it “paint[ed] a picture of
overseas slave labor that defendants perpetuated from
headquarters in the United States.”309 Thus, the court held that
300 Id. at 639 (quoting Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d
1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014)).
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 640.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 640–41.
306 Id. at 641.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 642.
309 Id.
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this “narrow set of domestic conduct [was] relevant to the ATS’s
focus.”310
3. The Aiding and Abetting Claim
The Ninth Circuit decided it was unnecessary to rule on the
aiding and abetting claim in light of the way Jesner shifted the
legal framework of ATS liability, which affected plaintiffs’
complaint.311 Plaintiffs conceded, however, and the Ninth
Circuit agreed, that it remained problematic that the complaint
discussed the remaining defendants as a single perpetrator.312
Moreover, because of Jesner, it was not possible, based on the
current record, that any culpable conduct actionable under the
ATS could be connected to the defendants.313 Just as the court
stated in Nestle II, “[i]t is common practice to allow plaintiffs to
amend their pleadings to accommodate changes in the law . . .
.”314 Despite the acknowledged delay this decision presented, the
court nevertheless determined it was best to allow plaintiffs to
amend their complaint to remove the foreign defendants and to
specify which potentially liable party was responsible for what
culpable conduct.315
4. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Bring Their Claims
Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ lacked Article III
standing because they failed to allege an actual and specified
injury that was connected to the disputed conduct and could be
redressed by a positive judicial outcome.316 The court rejected
this argument, discussing the appropriate remedies such as
compensatory damages or sanctions, which would reduce the
risk of forced child labor continuing.317 The court further
highlighted that plaintiffs satisfactorily alleged traceability to
the challenged conduct––specifically, concerning their
310

Id.
Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id. (quoting Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle II), 766 F.3d 1013, 1028
(9th Cir. 2014)).
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
311

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/4

42

2021

Doe v. Nestle, S.A.

303

allegations against Cargill.318 Thus, despite the deficient
allegations against Nestle, the court acknowledged the
sufficiency of the claims to be re-pleaded.319
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision of Nestle III and remanded the matter back to the
district court with permission for plaintiffs to amend their
complaint per the Jesner decision and its opinion.320
F. Petition for Certiorari – Nestle V (2020)
After the Ninth Circuit decided Nestle IV, Nestle U.S.A., Inc.
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on September 25, 2019,
including the following questions presented:
1. Whether an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic
corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350,
may overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based
on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States
and where plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which
occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that
activity. 2. Whether the Judiciary has the authority under the
Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations. 321

Plaintiffs, now respondents, filed an opposition on December 12,
2019, and petitioners filed their reply shortly thereafter on
December 23, 2019.322 On January 13, 2020, the Supreme Court
invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views
of the United States on this matter. 323 On July 2, 2020, the
Supreme Court granted Nestle U.S.A., Inc.’s petition,
consolidating it with a similar petition filed by Cargill, Inc.324
318

Id.
Id. at 642–43.
320 Id. at 643.
321 Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at i, Nestle U.S.A., Inc., v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188
(2020) (No. 19-416), 2019 WL 4747982.
322 See generally Br. in Opp., Nestle U.S.A., Inc, v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188
(2020) (No. 19-416), 2019 WL 6840721; Reply Br. in Supp. of Cert., Nestle
U.S.A., Inc, v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020) (No. 19-416) 2019 WL 7212365.
323 Nestle U.S.A., Inc. v. Doe I, 140 S. Ct. 912 (2020). As of January 5,
2020, twenty-five amicus briefs had been filed in connection with these
petitions.
324 Nestle U.S.A., Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (argued Dec. 1, 2020);
319
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This case had then entered its fifteenth year of litigation.
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should affirm the decision of the Ninth
Circuit, allowing this case to be remanded so that plaintiffs can
properly amend their complaint to be consistent with all prior
decisions. For purposes of the final portion of this case note, the
questions granted by the Supreme Court will not be addressed.
Plaintiffs’ success on remand will rely solely on their ability to
construct a plausible complaint that lists each domestic
corporations’ culpable U.S. conduct that is specifically linked to
the furtherance of the commission of forced labor, child labor,
torture, or cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment. By
removing the foreign defendants, plaintiffs have averted any
future defenses regarding corporate liability under the ATS. In
Nestle II, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs satisfied the
purpose standard with regard to the mens rea component of their
claim, and, in Nestle IV, the Ninth Circuit held that the narrow
set of domestic conduct provided by plaintiffs was relevant to the
ATS’s focus. Accordingly, the final challenge plaintiffs must
overcome is satisfying the actus reus component of their aiding
and abetting claim in conjunction with the ICTY’s Taylor and
Perišić decisions, as recommended by the court.
Concerning financial assistance, plaintiffs must show, or at
least create the plausible inference, that the financial assistance
provided by defendants to the Ivorian farmers was unrelated to
a commercial purpose. Asserting a noncommercial purpose can
be accomplished through a showing of a gratuitous gesture on
behalf of the defendants to specifically incentivize the farmers to
keep cocoa costs down. If plaintiffs can show that the most
logical way to keep cocoa costs down is through the use of forced
child labor or the like, they have ascertained the link between
the financial assistance and the commission of the crime.
Additionally, plaintiffs could show additional steps taken by the
defendants in providing such financial assistance to try and
convey the inference that more than the average contractual
payments were being made to the farmers in reliance on
continued low cocoa costs by use of forced child labor.
Cargill, Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 184 (argued Dec. 1, 2020).
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While certain farming supplies––such as chemicals,
fertilizers, and power tools––may be dangerous, they are not
criminal. Supplies must be specifically designed for an unlawful
purpose to support a close causal link to the principal crime.325
For the defendants’ to be found liable for aiding and abetting the
Ivorian farmers of child labor, forced labor, torture, or cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, as plaintiffs contend, they
must show that such crimes were perpetrated with the supplies
provided by defendants, that defendants provided such supplies
to further the criminal acts, and that the supplies had a
substantial effect on the criminal behavior. Plaintiffs must
establish which materials were used by the Ivorian farmers in
the commission of such crimes and whether those materials
were supplied by defendants. Plaintiffs allege that these child
workers are tortured and subjected to cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment; thus, it is probable that some sort of
instruments are involved to implement such conduct. If
plaintiffs can show that defendants supplied any tools or
chemicals not regularly used in the normal course of cocoa bean
farming and can only logically be inferred as a means of threat
and/or intimidation, they will have a better shot at successfully
alleging this claim.
With regard to technical assistance and training, plaintiffs
similarly must show that such technical assistance and training
were provided by defendants for the direct purpose of assisting
in the furtherance of the farmers’ forced labor, child labor,
torture, or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Instances
where courts have found the provision of training and technical
assistance to have had a substantial effect on a particular
criminal act occurred when such training and assistance was
customized to facilitate criminal acts.326 Plaintiffs must show
that the Ivorian farmers were trained by defendants to utilize
forms of torturous labor, or the like, for some benefit that
incentivized them or motivated them to continue utilizing it. If
325 See, for example, Zyklon B Case, supra note 146, which discusses the
defendant’s supplying of poison gas used to kill people.
326 See, for example, S. Afr. Apartheid Litig. v. Daimler, A.G., 617 F. Supp.
2d 228, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), wherein a database was specifically customized
to further criminal conduct.
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plaintiffs can show that defendants trained the farmers to only
employ children, maintain an inhuman work environment,
and/or use forceful and degrading techniques, their complaint
will raise the inference of a direct link between defendants’
training and the criminal acts that had a substantial effect.
Alternatively, plaintiffs may also succeed with an allegation
that defendants failed to correct the inhuman working
conditions by omitting to correct or properly train the farmers to
preserve a healthy and suitable work environment, especially if
they can show that the defendants knew how awful the farms’
working environments actually were.
For plaintiffs to
successfully allege that technical assistance had a substantial
effect or direct link to the crime at issue, they must prove that
defendants customized or required the use of some form of
software or database which provided the farmers with
information on keeping cocoa bean costs low and that the only
way the farmers knew or were able to sustain such low costs, as
directed by the software or database, was through the use of
child slave labor.
Lastly, the district court concluded in Nestle I that moral
support and tacit encouragement and approval, the theory under
which plaintiffs’ claim of failure to exercise economic leverage
falls, is not well-defined and universally accepted as required by
Sosa to be actionable. However, this conclusion should be
reconsidered. The court concluded four noteworthy points
regarding this area of law. First, there is a convincing argument
that defendants did maintain a legal duty to act. Defendant
corporations were all obligated to comply with both Convention
182 and The Harken-Engel Protocol.
Furthermore,
notwithstanding the illegality of slavery in the United States,
child labor is heavily regulated. Therefore, multi-billion-dollar
companies, such as defendants, should be legally obligated to
refrain from maintaining any exclusive buyer/supplier
relationships with businesses or farms that knowingly or
recklessly use any form of labor not lawfully permitted within
the United States. If defendants threatened to end to their
buyer/supplier relationship with the Ivorian farmers due to the
farmers’ failure to comply with Convention 182 and/or the
guidelines outlined in the Harkin-Engle Protocol, it is probable
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that the farmers would have reconsidered in order to sustain
such an economically advantageous business relationship to
them. Thus, defendants should be considered to have a legal
duty to end, or attempt to end, their business relationships with
the Ivorian farmers for their continued use of child slave labor
and, because they did not, they should be liable for aiding and
abetting same.
Second, just because aiding and abetting by way of moral
support and tacit encouragement and approval is rare or even
non-existent with regard to the Alien Tort Statute, that does not
mean the court should refrain from holding defendants liable.
Our courts have expanded the scope of the ATS since Filartiga
in 1980 and they should continue to do so today, especially when
a universal prohibition is at issue, such as the issue involved in
the case at bar. If the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that the
absence of precedent regarding corporate liability under the ATS
did not automatically imply that it was a legal impossibility, the
same standard should thus apply with aiding and abetting by
way of moral support and tacit encouragement and approval.
In contrast with the court’s conclusions, I believe plaintiffs
satisfy the tacit approval and encouragement theory since there
is a strong argument that defendants held a position of
administrative authority over the Ivorian farmers. Plaintiffs
have previously alleged that defendants participate in numerous
site visits to the Ivorian farms, which, with sufficient proof,
should fulfill the requirement of a physical presence if evidence
can be brought to prove that a high quantity of visits occurred
each year. Moreover, it is unquestionable that defendants
maintain a position of administrative authority over the Ivorian
farmers because they provide all the necessary supplies to keep
the farms up and running, they maintain substantial economic
leverage over the farmers, and they have great influence over
the cocoa farm industry as a whole on the Ivory Coast.
Defendants or defendants’ agents cannot successfully argue
that they were unaware of the farms’ labor uses if they or their
agents were physically present on the farms via their site visits.
Such presence clearly would have made them aware of the
apparent labor conditions. Further, the Ivorian farmers were
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obviously aware of such a presence, making them conscious of
defendants’ knowledge of the labor conditions utilized on the
farms. Thus, a plausible conclusion can be made that the
farmers inferred defendants’ approval of these conditions due to
their non-interference with the farm’s labor conditions during or
after these site visits occurred. Ultimately, with the appropriate
amendments, plaintiffs should likely finally have their day in
court, and the global prohibition on child slavery will be one step
closer to success.
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